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Returns
How you get your money back
The part most decks leave out
How you get your money back.
Everything else in this deck is about whether the company works. This page is about whether the investment works, which is a different question with a different answer. The entry terms below are fact. Everything downstream is arithmetic on assumptions we have listed openly so you can argue with them.
Before the upside
How you don’t lose money
Most decks answer “how much do I make” and never answer this one. It is the wrong order for anyone deploying their own capital rather than a fund’s.
The cost base is fixed and small
Non-marketing operating expenses run about $42K a month and have not moved in sixteen months. Marketing is discretionary and can be switched off in a week. A company that can return to a $42K monthly burn on command is very difficult to kill.
Gross margin means revenue converts to cash
At 89% gross margin, the only variable cost is revenue share. Every dollar of revenue above the fixed base is close to a dollar of cash. At even $6M of revenue this business generates real distributable cash rather than needing the next round.
The subscription can be turned back on
Going free is a decision, not a one-way door. The billing infrastructure, the price point, and 1,741 accounts that already paid at $15 all still exist. If the attention model fails, the fallback is a business that was growing 5.5× a year with a price attached.
There is an asset underneath the equity
29,287 registered families, 15,000 observed coach replies, and sixteen months of behavioural history. In a wind-down that data and the audience have a buyer. It is not a zero — which is more than most seed-stage software can say.
The downside case on the next page returns 0.3×. We show it deliberately — a returns page with only good outcomes is not credible, and this is the number to negotiate protection against.
Liquidation preference
A 1× non-participating preference means capital comes back before common in any sale below the money. Standard, and it is the single most effective protection available in this round.
Pro-rata rights
The right to maintain ownership in the Series A. If the model works, the second cheque is where much of the return is made; if it does not, the right costs nothing.
Information rights
Monthly reporting against the three metrics on the Milestones page. Early visibility on acquisition cost and first brand revenue is what makes the downside knowable rather than sudden.
Terms are open and none of the above is agreed. Listed because a buyer whose first question is capital preservation should not have to ask what protections are available.
Scenarios
Three outcomes, modelled
Switch between cases. Revenue at exit comes from the monetisation model — freemium, club licensing, and the college side landing in different combinations.
Revenue at exit
$20M
6 years from close
Exit multiple
6× revenue
Directional for the category
Enterprise value
$120M
At that revenue and multiple
Gross multiple
3.2×
21.4% IRR
What has to be true
Lifecycle freemium reaches roughly 100,000 paying accounts. Club licensing contributes. Strategic acquisition by a sports-data or education platform.
A $250K cheque in this round returns $800K in this scenario, before fees and taxes.
Models, not forecasts and not promises. Multiples are directional for vertical SaaS and marketplace businesses and vary widely with growth rate, retention, and the market at the time of sale.
Liquidity
Three ways this becomes cash
Series A and B secondary
Early holders frequently sell part of a position into later rounds. At the growth rates in the plan, a Series A within 24 months is the intended path and is the first realistic liquidity window.
Dividend or distribution
At 89% gross margin with a fixed cost base, a company at $20M revenue throws off real cash. Not the primary case, but it means this is not a binary outcome.
Strategic acquisition
The most likely path. The acquirer list above is short, well capitalised, and already consolidating this category.
Who buys this
The acquirer list is short and already consolidating
A believable exit needs a believable buyer. These four groups all have budgets, all have made acquisitions in adjacent categories, and all lack something we hold.
Sports data and media platforms
Hudl, Endeavor, Genius Sports, Stack Sports
We hold the decision layer they lack. Film, registration, and scheduling companies all own workflow without owning the matching intelligence that sits on top of it.
Education and enrolment technology
Enrolment marketing platforms, student-search providers
Athletic recruiting is a student-acquisition channel colleges already spend heavily on. A verified pipeline of matched, interested athletes is directly adjacent to what these businesses sell.
Consumer sports brands
Apparel, equipment, nutrition
Direct access to a household in its highest-spend athletic years, with permission and context that paid media cannot buy.
Private equity roll-up
Youth sports platform consolidators
The category is actively consolidating. A profitable, high-margin, low-churn asset with a national footprint is standard roll-up material.
Assumptions
Every input, stated
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership at entry | 11.11% | $2.5M at $20M pre-money |
| Dilution to exit | 40% | Assumes a Series A and one further round |
| Revenue at exit | $4M / $20M / $44M | From the monetisation model |
| Exit multiple | 3× / 6× / 9× revenue | Directional for vertical SaaS and marketplaces |
| Time to exit | 5 / 6 / 7 years | From close in January 2027 |
Change any one of these and the outcome changes materially. The two that matter most are revenue at exit, which depends entirely on whether the monetisation model lands, and dilution, which depends on how much more capital the company needs after this round. Both are argued in full elsewhere in this deck. Nothing on this page should be taken on faith.